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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Administrative law and constitutional law, which together constitute 
what we call “public law,” are closely related in many ways.1  For one 
thing, constitutional law refers to the body of the law that sets out the 
powers of public authorities by establishing the political system and 
stipulates the relationship between individuals and public authorities, 
while administrative law concerns “the ways in which the exercise of 
public power may be held to constitutional account.”2  Thus, “it [is] 
difficult to distinguish the values and principles of constitutional and 
administrative law.”3  However, this does not mean that administrative 
law is simply a synonym for constitutional law.  Rather, constitutional 
law constitutes the “background theory” under which administrative law 
functions, and not the other way around.  This is the reason why leading 
administrative law casebooks begin with the issues centering on how 
administrative law, or rather the administrative state, should be viewed 
through a constitutional lens.4  Put differently, constitutional law, as the 
reference point of the legal system,5 stands apart from administrative 
laws, setting the perimeters of values and principles for the latter to 
 
 1. Due to the obscure distinction between public and private law in the common 
law tradition, the idea of public law in the common law world is not as clear as in the 
civil law system. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE 
FUTURE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY OVER TWO MILLENNIA 41–44 (2002).  However, with the 
global rise of the administrative state in the twentieth century, academic communities in 
Anglo-American legal scholarship have accepted public law.  See, e.g., MARTIN LOUGHLIN, 
THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW (2003) [hereinafter LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW]; JERRY L. 
MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES 
AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2003). 
 2. See DAMIAN CHALMERS & ADAM TOMKINS, EUROPEAN UNION PUBLIC LAW: 
TEXT AND MATERIALS 311 (2007). 
 3. See Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and 
Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 208 (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., MASHAW ET AL., supra note 1, at 59–304 (discussing the 
constitutional roles of the legislative and executive powers in controlling administrative 
agencies); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 31–140 (6th ed. 2006) (addressing the constitutional 
position of administrative agencies); PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
CASES AND COMMENTS 48–225 (Rev. 10th ed. 2003) (setting up the constitutional 
framework for administration). 
 5. See also Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living 
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1756 (2007). 
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implement in the context of public administration.6  Taken together, 
constitutional law and administrative law are closely linked but stand as 
distinct sets of legal values in our traditional legal thinking.7 
However, the relationship between constitutional and administrative 
law seems to be undergoing a great transformation in the global context.  
On the one hand, as an original act of “naming,” the term “global 
administrative law” has been given to the attempt to systematize and 
rationalize the results of transboundary regulations in terms of global 
governance, without looking for its constitutional underpinnings.8  On 
the other, constitutionalism has been proclaimed to go beyond national 
borders and prevail over the Westphalian assumption of international 
relations by taking the practice of global governance as its own birth 
certificate.9  For this reason, the relationship between constitutional law 
and administrative law seems to become inverted when set against the 
backdrop of global governance.  Whether this inversion heralds a new 
epoch of legal thinking and the coming of a global rule of law, or 
whether it exemplifies a challenge to the rule of law in the global era, 
lies at the center of this Article. 
By critically examining the status of global administrative law within 
the already widely acknowledged notion of “global constitutionalism,” I 
aim to explore the theoretical as well as normative fragmentation 
 
 6. See Harlow, supra note 3, at 207–08.  For how the separation of constitutional 
law from the body of nonconstitutional law plays out in legal epistemology and the 
institutional structure of constitutional democracy, see Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional 
Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 MOD. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003) (identifying an epistemic 
duality—the body of constitutional law and the residual body of “ordinary” legal acts—
inherent in the corpus juris).  It should be noted that through the lens of legal realism, 
this distinction between constitutional law and nonconstitutional law is the epitome of 
“conceptual jurisprudence.”  See also GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: 
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 24–33 (1995).  Whether conceptual or 
empty, this epistemic duality has influenced the way our inherited legal system functions 
and our legal thinking.  See Michelman, supra.  I thank Professor Francesca Bignami for 
bringing the perspective of legal realism to my attention. 
 7. British scholar S.A. de Smith noted that “constitutional law and administrative 
law . . . occupy[] distinct provinces, but also a substantial area of common ground.”  See 
Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law Determined?, in THE PROVINCE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 1 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (quoting S.A. DE SMITH, THE 
LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 (1960)). 
 8. See generally Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 995 (2005). 
 9. See, e.g., Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of 
Sovereignty: The Emergence of the Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 425 (1999).  See also Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 
37 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 763, 763–72 (2005). 
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between global administrative law and global constitutionalism.10  While 
global constitutionalism refers to the process of “constitutionalizing” an 
increasingly globalized world by way of the values implicit in cross-
border regulatory cooperation, the global regulatory practice at the heart 
of global administrative law appears to take the place of “We the People” as 
the creative force behind global constitutionalism.  This relationship 
between global administrative law and global constitutional law suggests 
a unity of global legality, whether it be called administrative law or 
constitutionalism.  I argue that this “identitarian unity” between administrative 
law and constitutional law in the global context poses challenges to the 
ideal of the global rule of law.  On the one hand, global administrative 
lawyers focus on the global coordination or rationalization of administrative 
policies without paying sufficient attention to their impacts on the 
development of global constitutionalism.  On the other hand, by premising 
global constitutionalization on the practices of global regulation, global 
constitutionalists overlook the problems inherent in global administrative 
law itself.  My analysis of these positions shows that the status quo of 
global administrative law can only be maintained by “outsourcing” the 
fundamental challenges to global constitutionalism. That is, global 
legality is saved from fragmentation not by a unitary global public law, 
but instead by assuming “legal duality” as is customary in traditional 
legal thinking. 
My argument proceeds as follows: Part II explores the conceptualization 
of global administrative law and global constitutional law. It also 
discusses whether the ways they are distinctly conceptualized point to a 
unitary public law, dissolving the traditional distinction between constitutional 
and administrative law.  Part III examines some issues embedded in the 
discourse on global administrative law and global constitutionalism.  I 
argue that constitutional law does not disappear from the discourse on 
global administrative law but rather stands as the background against 
which it is self-referentially rationalized and legitimated.  In Part IV, 
besides summarizing the main arguments, I conclude by suggesting that 
normative issues concerning global governance cannot be fully 
addressed until the relationship between global administrative law and 
global constitutional law is brought to the fore in the discussion on the 
global rule of law. 
II.  THE STATE OF GLOBAL LEGALITY 
The buzzword “globalization” characterizes myriads of developments 
that started prior to, or in the wake of, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, 
 
 10. See Symposium, Global Constitutionalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2007). 
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and has since become virtually irresistible to academic disciplines.  Law 
is no exception.  “Legal globalization,”11 “the globalization of law,”12 or 
anything with an epithet evoking globalization such as the “global rule 
of law”13 and “globalized judiciary,”14 to name just a pair, are widespread in 
legal scholarship.  In this Part, I first discuss how administrative law has 
been brought into the fold of globalization scholarship.  Next, I proceed 
to explore the way that constitutionalism has been projected beyond 
state boundaries.  This Part concludes with the suggestion that in terms 
of the development of global administrative law and global constitutionalism, 
a unitary global public law seems to be emerging, subsuming the 
administrative and constitutional provinces into its territory. 
A.  Making Sense of Global Administrative Law: The                       
Bootstrapping of Global Governance 
While administrative law is conventionally discussed in the domestic 
context, it has been noted that it also exists in international settings.15  In 
contrast to the old “international administrative law,” the identity of 
global administrative law is constructed against the backdrop of emerging 
global governance that transcends the boundaries of nation-states.  
Global administrative law is to global governance as international 
administrative law is to “international administration.”16  The notion of 
international administration, the object that international administrative 
law aims to rein in, is broad, including not only international institutions 
but also domestic administrative actors when they function in relation to 
 
 11. See, e.g., David Levi-Faur, The Political Economy of Legal Globalization: 
Juridification, Adversarial Legalism and Responsive Regulation: A Comment, 59 INT’L 
ORG. 451 (2005). 
 12. See, e.g., Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 973 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Globalization of Law]; Martin Shapiro, The 
Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993). See also Duncan 
Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–1968, 36 SUFFOLK U.L. 
REV. 631 (2003). 
 13. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, The Alien Tort and the Global Rule of Law, 57 INT’L 
SOC. SCI. J. 551 (2005). 
 14. See, e.g., Ken I. Kersch, The “Globalized Judiciary” and the Rule of Law, 13 
GOOD SOC’Y 17 (2004). 
 15. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 19–20 (2005).  See also Daniel C. Esty, Good 
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 
1490, 1493–95 (2006). 
 16. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 18–19. 
KUO 7/22/2009  4:32:58 PM 
 
444 
transboundary regulations.17  In contrast, global governance, or global 
administration to which global administrative law is seen to respond, is 
more complex and multifarious. 
In a pioneering work on the concept of global administrative law, 
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart identify five 
types of global administration, which they argue set the emerging global 
administrative law apart from traditional international administrative 
law.18  In addition to international administration and what they call 
“distributed administration,” both of which were formerly the objects of 
international administrative law,19 they identify three other types of 
global administration: “transnational networks and coordination 
arrangements,” “hybrid intergovernmental-private administration,” and 
“private bodies.”20  To address the issues arising from global governance, 
traditional administrative law tools such as procedural fairness, 
transparency requirement, and accountability control are deployed in the 
global setting, giving rise to “global administrative law.”21 
 
 17. See id. at 18–20. 
 18. See id. at 20–23. See also Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: 
Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2006). 
 19. According to Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart’s definition, “distributed 
administration” refers to the type of administration in which “domestic regulatory 
agencies act as part of the global administrative space . . . tak[ing] decisions on issues of 
foreign or global concern.”  See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 21.  Also, they note 
that the pre-1945 “broad notions of ‘international administration’” included not only 
“international institutions” but also “domestic administrative actors when taking actions 
with transboundary significance.”  See id. at 19–21.  Taken together, what Kingsbury, 
Krisch, and Stewart calls “distributed administration” constitutes part of “broad notions 
of ‘international administration’” in the pre-1945 international administrative law, while 
“international administration” in their definition refers to the narrower notion of 
“international institutions.”  See id. 
 20. In Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart’s definition, “transnational networks and 
coordination arrangements” as “horizontal form of administration” are “characterized by 
the absence of a binding formal decisionmaking structure and the dominance of informal 
cooperation among state regulators.”  See id. at 21.  An example of this type of global 
administration is the Basel Committee, under which the heads of various central banks, 
“outside any treaty structure,” are brought together in order to coordinate their policies 
on capital adequacy requirements for banks among other things.  See id.  “Hybrid 
intergovernmental-private administration” refers to bodies, which combine private and 
governmental actors, in charge of various transboundary regulatory matters.  See id. at 
22.  For example, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which produces standards on 
food safety that gain a quasi-mandatory effect via the SPS Agreement under the WTO 
law, is composed of non-governmental actors as well as governmental representatives.  
See id.  As regards “private bodies” in global administration, Kingsbury, Krisch, and 
Stewart discuss the private International Standardization Organization (ISO) among 
other examples.  See id. at 22–23.  The over 13,000 standards that the ISO has adopted to 
harmonize product and process rules not only have major economic impacts but are also 
used in regulatory decisions by treaty-based authorities such as the WTO.  See id. 
 21. See id. at 37–41; Esty, supra note 15, at 1524–37. 
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As Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart note, informality and pluralism, 
among other things, distinguish global administrative law from traditional 
administrative law, both domestic and international.22  This is not surprising 
given that global administrative law aims to tame and improve global 
administration, which, as noted above, includes conventional international 
administration and new types of administration.  Thus, the novelty of 
global administration lies not only in its containing new types of 
administration but also its reconfiguring of the conventional types of 
international administration in the global context.  While the new types 
of administration reflect the informal nature of global governance, the 
coexistence of new and conventional types of administration in global 
governance indicates the multifaceted constitution of global governance.  
Yet, to make sense of global administrative law, a closer look at the 
constitution of global governance and its role in theorizing global 
administrative law is required. 
New types of administration require corresponding new visions of 
administrative law.  Thus, with the emergence of informal types of 
administration such as transnational networks and coordination 
arrangements, hybrid administration, and private bodies, an informality-
oriented administrative law, coexisting with traditional administrative 
law in which international administrative law and domestic administrative 
law occupy distinct territories, seems to be necessary.23  Nevertheless, 
these new types of administration, together with conventional international 
administration, are subsumed under the rubric of global governance, calling 
for global administrative law in the place of traditional international 
administrative law. 
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart regard the pre-1945 paradigm of 
international administrative law, which can be traced back to the mid-
nineteenth century, as the predecessor of global governance.24  Still, it 
differs from the emerging global administrative law in an important way.  
International administration, which was at the center of traditional 
international administrative law, did not go beyond the Westphalian 
system and thus international administrative law did not take the place of 
domestic administrative law.  On the one hand, international administrative 
law focused on areas such as postal services, navigation, and 
 
 22. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 53–54. 
 23. See id.; Esty, supra note 15, at 1537–42.  See also Cassese, Globalization of 
Law, supra note 12, at 976–77. 
 24. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 19–20 & n.11. 
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telecommunication, which gave rise to “international unions,”25 and 
indeed derived from the international union-creating treaties that were 
concluded under the Westphalian system.  On the other hand, international 
administrative law extended to domestic administrators only when they 
took actions with transboundary significance.26  Specifically, although it 
has been argued that international unions were trusted “with significant 
powers of secondary rulemaking which did not require national 
ratification to be legally effective,” these autonomous secondary 
rulemaking powers only existed in fields whose regulatory framework 
had been set out in treaties.27 The drive to extend international 
administration beyond international institutions to include domestic 
administrators comes from the fact that their cooperation is crucial to the 
implementation of unratified secondary rules.28  The development of 
international administrative law is thus rooted in the central role of 
domestic administrators in the success of international administration. 
In contrast, the position of domestic administrators in global 
governance, from which global administrative law is derived, is not 
distinct from that of other regulatory players.  Rather, these administrators 
share the center stage as the main players with other actors from the 
private realm and international civil service.  Domestic administrators, 
both in international administration that involves intergovernmental 
organizations established by treaties or executive agreements and in 
distributed administration or other types of global administration, and 
other actors are equal players in an extended sphere of global 
administration.29  This new “global administrative space” makes global 
administrative law post-Westphalian and post-Hobbesian.30 
Global administrative law is post-Westphalian because nation-states 
and their representatives do not play dominant roles in the administrative 
space.  In order to resolve diverse transboundary issues ranging from 
core concerns such as antiterrorism responses and other national security 
questions to everyday routine matters like fishery supply, national 
governments need to cooperate with all possible players, regardless of 
whether they operate within the national boundary.31  Nation-states in 
 
 25. See id. at 19. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 20–27. 
 30. See generally Mathias Albert & Tanja Kopp-Malek, The Pragmatism of Global 
and European Governance: Emerging Forms of the Political ‘Beyond Westphalia’, 31 
MILLENNIUM – J. INT’L STUD. 453 (2002). 
 31. See Cassese, Globalization of Law, supra note 12, at 973–77.  See also Sabino 
Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 
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the traditional form, which occupy the center of the Westphalian world 
system, no longer hold a monopoly on transboundary regulatory issues.  
Instead, nation-states are disaggregating.32  Moreover, the relationship 
among the players in the global administrative space is post-Hobbesian, 
in that national self-interest plays a lesser role in global administration.  
The problem-solving attitude of pragmatism takes the place of realism in 
addressing transboundary regulatory issues.33 Certainly, transnational 
cooperation in tackling transboundary issues is no novelty, yet what 
distinguishes the concept of global administrative space and the 
corresponding global administrative law is that cooperative efforts are 
reinterpreted through a pragmatic lens. 
Specifically, this pragmatism at the heart of global administrative law 
and global governance involves a twofold conceptual shift.  First, given 
the transboundary or global nature of contemporary regulatory issues, 
administrative space, which previously centered on the nation-state, has 
been reconceptualized.  While traditional nation-state-centered administrative 
space covers the area of the politico-juridical authority of the nation-
state, this new administrative space is conceptualized in accordance with 
the nature of the subject matter at issue.  In other words, in traditional 
administrative law, administrative space, the object of administrative 
law, is defined by the source of its delegated authority.34  Thus, nation-
states, as the only source of legitimate power in the Westphalian world 
system, determine the scope of administrative space.  In terms of domestic 
law, the nation-state constitutes the prototype of domestic administrative 
space, while internationally the scope of administrative law extends only 
to the subject matters that nation-states consent to delegate to 
international institutions or other treaty-based regulatory mechanism. 
In contrast, in global administrative law, the targeted administrative 
space is determined by how and where global regulatory issues will be 
best tackled.35  Thus, the scope of global administrative space is not 
 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663, 663–670 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Administrative Law 
Without the State]. 
 32. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) [hereinafter 
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, 
Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041 
(2003). 
 33. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 54–57. 
 34. See generally Jack M. Beermann, The Reach of Administrative Law in the 
United States, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 171. 
 35. See Andreas Fisher-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 
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embedded in the source of legitimate power but is functionally determined 
instead.  As a result, nation-states function in regard to global administration 
as subnational administrative districts function in regard to national 
administration, except that the national constitution serves as the 
reference point for the relationship between subnational administrative 
districts and national administration, whereas the superimposition of 
global administration on existing administrative spaces is functionally 
motivated. 
Second, global administrative law serves to improve the functionality 
of global governance.  Given that global administrative space provides a 
better arena for dealing with global regulatory issues, global administrative 
law adopts administrative legal tools from national experiences, with an 
eye to making the decisions of global administrative players more 
acceptable to those under regulation.36  It should be noted, however, that 
these tools were developed to address the normative position of regulatory 
administration in relation to other branches of power in national 
constitutional systems.37  Even though there may be common procedural 
mechanisms and substantive values in terms of comparative administrative 
law, they materialized with reference to individual constitutional norms 
and legal traditions.38 
In contrast, in the global administrative space, which lacks a common 
set of constitutional norms and a shared legal tradition, global 
administrative law focuses on making people receptive to the decisions 
of global governance.  Global administrative law works to improve the 
rationality of the decisions by enhancing the role of reason and 
rationality in the decision-making process.  Also, by providing for 
reviewing mechanisms through which not only arbitrary or capricious 
decisions but also irrational policies can be detected and set aside, reason 
and rationality are expected to duly function in global administration.39  
Global administrative law, as a discipline and as a practice, by combining its 
function-driven nature and the configuration of the global administrative 
 
1021 (2004).  Cf. LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 1, at 97 (noting the emergence of 
“a ‘systems-oriented’ framework of regulatory law operating in accordance with a 
‘single logic of rule,’ which transcends territorial units, in the post-nation-state age of 
‘imperial sovereignty.’”). 
 36. See Esty, supra note 15, at 1524–37. 
 37. For example, the enactment of Administrative Procedure Act in the United 
States and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on administrative law are aimed to 
address the needs of the administrative/regulatory state under the separation-of power 
structure conceived in the American constitutional system.  See BREYER ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 13–37. 
 38. See Beermann, supra note 34.  See also Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of 
Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and 
France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341, 1345–49 (2004). 
 39. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 37–41; Esty, supra note 15, at 1529–30. 
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space transcending existing politico-juridical spaces defined by national 
constitutions, is part of the bootstrapping of global governance.40  Global 
administrative law helps a function-driven, pragmatic global administration 
to fulfill its self-imposed telos of ushering in the global era of the 
rule of law by increasing the acceptability of its decisions concerning 
global regulatory issues. 
B.  From Functional Administration to Global Constitutionalization:           
A Global Constitutionalist Initiative 
As noted in the preceding section, global administrative law is 
conceived without presuming a positive code of general administrative 
law.  Likewise, global constitutionalism emerges independently of a 
world constitutional charter.41  Rather, aspiring to a world order based on 
the idea of the rule of law, global constitutionalists argue that even 
without a world constitutional charter, the post-Cold War era has 
witnessed the “constitutionalization” of the world order.42  At the heart 
of the constitutionalized world order is the notion of constitutionalism, 
which assumes a higher law as the reference point for the rest of the 
body of the law.  Along this line of thinking, global constitutionalists 
claim to have discerned a set of normative values among the practice 
of global governance.  Moreover, they argue that together with 
normative principles rooted in traditional sources of international law, 
the normative values implicit in the practice of global governance 
constitute the “higher law” of the world order.43 Corresponding to the 
constitutionalization of the European Union, global constitutionalism 
 
 40. In line with Jon Elster’s use of “bootstrapping,” which involves a clean break 
with a preconstitutional past in constitutional politics, I adopt the term here to refer to the 
disconnection of theorizing a global administrative space and a corresponding global 
administrative law from the existing norm-laden politico-juridical space centering on 
nation-states.  See Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
57 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994). 
 41. A notable exception is German legal scholar Bardo Fassbender, who argues for 
the United Nations Charter as the world constitution.  See Bardo Fassbender, The United 
Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 529 (1998). 
 42. See Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment 
on a Proposal from Germany, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 223, 224–25 (2006). 
 43. See also Mark Weston Janis, The Quest for a Higher Law, 116 YALE L.J. 317 
(Supp. 2007) (book review), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/04/07/janis.html. 
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extends the idea of constitutionalization without a constitution to the 
global scale.44 
At the core of the global constitutionalist project of constitutionalizing 
the world order without a constitution lies an “external” sociological 
perspective on law, necessary to understand the new world order: “there 
is a continuum between legal and nonlegal obligations and a broad 
spectrum of norms that ranges from soft to hard law.”45 Outside 
municipal legal systems and traditional international law, it is not a 
lawless wilderness but instead “a world full of law” that results from an 
independent process of global lawmaking.46 
Various designations have been attached to the phenomenon of global 
lawmaking such as “legal and constitutional pluralism,”47 “multilevel 
governance,”48 “societal constitutionalism,”49 “transnational government 
networks,”50 and “cosmopolitan human rights law enforced by humanitarian 
 
 44. See, e.g., Frank Schorkopf, Constitutionalization or a Constitution for the 
European Union?, in THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
GERMAN AND POLISH PERSPECTIVES 1 (Adam Bodnar et al. eds., 2003); Susan C. Breau, 
The Constitutionalization of the International Legal Order, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 545 
(2008) (book review). 
 45. Jean L. Cohen, Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law, 18 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1, 7 (2004).  See also SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 
32, at 178–81; Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 37 (Judith Goldstein et al. eds., 
2001); Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in 
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 21 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). 
 46. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 7. See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 45, at 
38–39.  Cf. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Post-Modern Constitutional Theory: A Prospect for the 
Self-Organising Society, 60 MOD. L. REV. 617, 623–26 (1997) [hereinafter Ladeur, Post-
Modern Constitutional Theory] (discussing how a switch of focus from individual liberty 
to group autonomy would help to overcome the regulatory challenges resulting from the 
uncertainty and complexity of contemporary society in the context of liberal democracy); 
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality—The Viability of the 
Network Concept, 3 EUR. L.J. 33, 49–52 (1997) [hereinafter Ladeur, Towards a Legal 
Theory of Supranationality] (regarding the networked self-regulation of private players 
in the supranational regulatory context of the EU as the predecessor of a new type of 
transnational regulation). 
 47. See Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317 
(2002).  See also GAVIN W. ANDERSON, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFTER GLOBALIZATION 
39–151 (2005). 
 48. See Markus Perkmann, Policy Entrepreneurs, Multilevel Governance and 
Policy Networks in the European Polity: The Case of the EUREGIO (2003), http://www. 
lancs.ac.uk/fss/sociology/ papers/perkmann-policy-entrepreneurs.pdf.  See also Ingolf 
Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution- 
Making Revisited?, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 703 (1999). 
 49. See Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-
Centered Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
3 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism]. 
 50. See SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 32, at 8; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
283, 288 (2004). 
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intervention.”51 At its core is what political theorist Jean Cohen calls 
“the juridification of the new world order.”52  In traditional international 
law, state consent is the legal basis for the authority of international legal 
regimes53 and national constitutions provide the framework within which 
controversies regarding state consent are resolved.54  In contrast to this 
Westphalian world composed of national jurisdictions, the world order 
envisioned by legal globalists does not rest on state consent. Rather, it 
emerges out of a global process of juridification independent of an 
individual state’s will and also of its constitutional framework. 
What sets the global process of juridification apart from the 
development of “juridification” in terms of municipal law is the way that 
the law is conceived. In contrast to the court-centered concept of 
domestic juridification,55 the global process of juridification extends to 
the operation of nonjudicial actors in global governance.  Through the lens 
of global juridification, the modus operandi of each subject field that 
emerges from the practice of everyday governance is institutionalized 
through myriad self-regulatory networks, developing into a networked 
global legal regime.  Moreover, the global legal regime generalizes and 
stabilizes normative expectations in each sector of subject matter and 
 
 51. See Michael W. Doyle, The New Interventionism, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 219 
(Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2001).  See also SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 
29, 72 (Robert Post ed., 2006). 
 52. Cohen, supra note 45, at 2. 
 53. See Martti Koskenniemi, Introduction to SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 
xi, xii (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 2000). 
 54. Compare BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? 
(1995), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on 
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) 
(debating on the constitutionality of the ratification procedure of the NAFTA, through 
which the United States expressed its consent to that international “treaty”).  This 
corresponds to the modern international law principle of sovereign equality in that 
constitutions as the embodiment of national sovereignty are equally weighted in regard 
to the domestic recognition of international law.  See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (6th ed. 2003).  That the domestic recognition of 
international law is controlled by national constitutions can be exemplified by Article 48 
of the defunct draft EU Constitutional Treaty, which provides that the draft Treaty shall 
be ratified by all party states according to their constitutional requirements.  See Bruno 
de Witte, The Process of Ratification and the Crisis Option: A Legal Perspective, in THE 
EU CONSTITUTION: THE BEST WAY FORWARD? 21, 21 (Deidre Curtin et al. eds., 2005). 
 55. See also Lars Trägårdh & Michael X. Delli Carpini, The Juridification of 
Politics in the United States and Europe: Historical Roots, Contemporary Debates and 
Future Prospects, in AFTER NATIONAL DEMOCRACY: RIGHTS, LAW AND POWER IN 
AMERICA AND THE NEW EUROPE 41 (Lars Trägårdh ed., 2004). 
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thus enhances global governance.56  In other words, the networked 
norm-making regime amounts to the function of norms autonomously 
materializing in the process of globalizing governance. 
To global constitutionalists, this new model of norm-making functions 
noticeably as a “constitutional” order for the world,57 constituting the 
“ultimate rule of recognition” on a global scale.58  In this view, the question 
of what is law and non-law in the traditional municipal legal system is no 
longer decided solely by reference to national constitutions.59  Rather, 
 
 56. Compare Bernhard Zangl, Is There an Emerging International Rule of Law?, 
in TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE? 73 (Stephan Leibfreid & Michael Zürn eds., 2005) 
(noting the wide acceptance of dispute settlement procedures in four issue areas in 
international law—international trade, security, labor, and environmental law—as 
indicative of an emerging (quasi)international rule of law complementing modern states’ 
domestic rule of law), with Daniele Archibugi & Iris Marion Young, Envisioning a 
Global Rule of Law, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 158 (James P. Sterba 
ed., 2003) (arguing that an international criminal justice centered strategy in the place of 
“war on terror” in response to global terrorism would contribute to a global rule of law 
that goes beyond the existing focus on international trade, investment, and environmental 
protection).  This networked global legal regime results either from intergovernmental 
networks of regulatory cooperation or from lex mercatoria (merchant law) and its 
variations. See generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 45.  See also 
Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism, supra note 49, at 21–23 (lex electronica and lex 
mercatoria); Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Themis Sapiens: Comments on Inger-Johanne 
Sand, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 49, at 67, 
72–73 (lex mercatoria, lex informatica, and lex sportiva); Michelle Everson, Law and 
Non-Law in the Constitutionalisation of Europe: Comments on Eriksen and Fossum, in 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 49, at 147, 155 (lex 
mercatoria and lex digitalis); Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and 
Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 627 (2006) (lex mercatoria). 
 57. See TOWARDS WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF 
THE WORLD COMMUNITY (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 
2005); Constance Jean Schwindt, Interpreting the United Nations Charter: From Treaty 
to World Constitution, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 193 (2000). See also BENHABIB, 
supra note 51, at 71–72.  Cf. Christian Walter, Constitutionalizing (Inter)national 
Governance—Possibilities for and Limits to the Development of an International 
Constitutional Law, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 170 (2001) (proposing a segmented, as 
opposed to comprehensive, version of international constitutional law).  This “conceptual 
shift” is related to the globalist epistemological shift to an external sociological 
perspective of the law.  See Cohen, supra note 45, at 7. 
 58. As Joseph Raz emphasizes, the rule of recognition in H.L.A. Hart’s legal 
theory exists as “a practice of the legal officials” and stands apart from constitutions.  See 
Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 160–62 (Larry Alexander ed., 
1998). Nevertheless, the sociological view of global constitutionalization brings the 
practice-embedded world constitutional order closer to the Hartian rule of recognition.  
The term “rule of recognition” is adopted here in a metaphorical sense.  Cf. Bert van 
Roermund, Sovereignty: Unpopular and Popular, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 33, 42 
(Neil Walker ed., 2003) (identifying Rousseau’s notion of “general will” and popular 
sovereignty as “the ultimate rule of recognition” in the normative system of 
democracies). 
 59. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 7.  See also Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism, 
supra note 49, at 8. 
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national constitutions are part of a multilevel constitutional order in 
which the distinction between law and non-law is made. 
As pointed out in the preceding section, global administrative law is 
tied to global governance.  Moreover, the central goal of global governance 
is to effectively resolve global regulatory issues through reasonable and 
rational measures.  Driven by this problem-solving mentality, administrative 
actors in the global administrative space develop different patterns of 
measures, or sector-oriented, self-referential “modi operandi,” in 
response to regulatory needs.  Through the lens of administrative law, 
many of these responsive patterns and “modi operandi,” which help 
administrative actors, focused on legality and consistency, to better 
tackle global issues, look like an “internal administrative law” or 
“internal law of administration” within the global administrative space.60  
These administrative practices concerning global governance in the eyes 
of global constitutionalists are, however, transposed to the constitutional 
order of the globalized world.  In other words, through the theoretical 
initiative of global constitutionalists, a practice that is driven by a 
problem-solving mentality to make global administration functional in 
the eyes of global administrative law is layered with normative 
implications, laying the foundations for global constitutionalism.61 
C.  Towards a Unitary Global Public Law? 
Taken as a whole, global governance constitutes the point of 
convergence of global administrative and constitutional law.  Granted, 
administrative law tools are adopted to better global governance, yet the 
values underpinning the traditional administrative law tools rather than 
those tools themselves lie at the center of global administrative law.62  
Moreover, it has been further argued that the practice resulting from the 
particular character of global governance, which focuses on informality 
and pluralism, represents a better translation of common administrative 
law values into global administrative law.63 In other words, global 
governance itself is regarded as embodying the normative administrative 
 
 60. For the idea of “internal administrative law” or “internal law of administration,” see 
Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Federal Administrative 
Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1686, 1737–40 (2007). 
 61. See Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State, supra note 31, at 687–89.  
See also Cassese, Globalization of Law, supra note 12, at 985–86. 
 62. See, e.g., Cassese, Globalization of Law, supra note 12, at 976–77. 
 63. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 55. 
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law values in the global context.  In this way, the practice of global 
governance rather than normative ideals of traditional administrative law 
defines the contents of global administrative law.  Global governance 
and global administrative law, which connotes the efforts to apply 
traditional administrative law tools to rein in and reform global 
governance, are in a relationship of reflexivity.64 
It has been argued that global administrative law leaves out those 
decisions concerning “important questions of principle (who should 
have ultimate authority?)” and thus falls short of a “framework[] of a 
more constitutionalist character.”65  Nevertheless, driven by intellectual 
effort and regulatory experiences, global administrative law has been 
equated with “all the rules and procedures that help ensure the 
accountability of global administration.”66  Despite the ambiguity of 
scope of global administrative law, global constitutionalists make much 
of “all the rules and procedures that help ensure the accountability of global 
administration” in their effort of constitutionalizing the globalizing world.  
From the perspective of global constitutionalists, the pragmatic norm-
making process of global governance emerges as the source of higher 
normative principles for the world order.  In this way, global governance, 
which drives the constitutionalization of the post-Westphalian world order, 
also becomes the basis for global constitutionalism.67 
In sum, while global administrative law scholars and global 
constitutionalists occupy distinct academic legal disciplines and focus on 
two distinct parts of the legal order, their fields seem to fuse into a 
unitary branch of global law: global public law.68  Is this the state of 
global legality?  What questions arise from this fusion, which defies the 
 
 64. Cf. Neil Walker, EU Constitutionalism and New Governance, in LAW AND 
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 15, 33–36 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott 
eds., 2006) (discussing the reciprocal relationship between constitutionalism and 
governance in the supranational context of the European Union). 
 65. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 18, at 10.  See also Nico Krisch, The 
Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 247 (2006). 
 66. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 28. See also Neil Walker, Beyond 
Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative 
Orders, 6 INT’L J. CON. L. 373, 381 (2008) (noting the expansive character of “the 
Global Administrative Law project”). 
 67. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 8.  See also Fisher-Lescano & Teubner, supra 
note 35, at 1014–17; Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism, supra note 49, at 7–9; Walter, 
supra note 57, at 191–96.  Cf. Ladeur, Post-Modern Constitutional Theory, supra note 
46, at 623–26 (discussing how a shift to problem-solving in regulatory strategies would 
emerge as a new paradigm for the organization and exercise of public power in the post-
national liberal state). 
 68. Cf. Gunther Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and 
Dual Constitution of Autonomous Sectors?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 71 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2003) [hereinafter Teubner, Global Private 
Regimes] (noting the emergence of global law as laying the constitutional foundations 
for the globalized world order, but embedding it in private regimes). 
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traditional view of the relationship between administrative and constitutional 
law?69  These are the issues answered in Part III. 
III.  AN ANATOMY OF GLOBAL LEGAL UNITY: TOWARDS A 
FRAGMENTED GLOBAL LAW OR BACK TO                                                          
LEGAL DUALITY? 
The above discussion on the emergence of global administrative and 
constitutional law within global legality suggests that these two 
distinctive provinces of public law seem to be indistinct and fused into a 
unitary global public law, creating what I call “global legal unity.”  To 
clarify, by global legal unity I do not mean that a unitary public law 
following the traditional pyramid structure of national legal systems has 
been set up in the globalized world.  The state of global legality is diverse, 
pluralist, and multilayered, without an identifiable unitary source of 
law.70  Rather, global legal unity here refers to the identitarian relationship 
between administrative law and constitutional law in regard to the 
exercise of public power concerning global governance. 
Despite the unity between global administrative and constitutional 
law, a closer inspection of this global legal unity will expose the complexity 
lying beneath the unitary global public law.  In this Part, I aim to 
establish that neither unity nor fragmentation or separation accounts for 
the relationship between global administrative law and global constitutional 
law. I first discuss how administrative law is constructed by leaving the 
central concerns of global constitutionalism unaddressed. I then proceed 
to explore the way that the issues concerning global governance and 
global administrative law are left out of the discourse on global 
constitutionalism.  To conclude, I argue that from the perspective of 
global administrative lawyers, global administrative law does not lose sight 
of its constitutional counterpart.  Rather, global constitutionalism stands 
in the background as the “constitutive other” to the construction of the 
identity of global administrative law, pointing to a relationship of duality 
in global public law. 
 
 69. See supra text accompanying notes 1–7. 
 70. See Krisch, supra note 65, at 269–74. 
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A.  Rationalization and Legitimation Untied 
Global administrative law aims to make decisions on global regulatory 
issues more rational, acceptable, and thus legitimate, by making global 
administration more transparent, more participatory, and more accountable.  
However, participation in global administration is different from the 
model of traditional political participation. Global administrative law 
characteristically insulates global administration from the ordinary 
traditional political process.  Reasonableness and rationality constitute 
the central concerns of enhancing the participation in global administration, 
while reasoned analysis is the common language in the policymaking 
network of global governance.71 
Specifically, global governance does not derive its legitimacy from a 
higher law in the way domestic administration refers to national constitutions.  
Nor does it base its legitimacy on the paradigm of representative 
democracy on which the principal-agent model of accountability 
centers.72  Legitimacy does not take the center stage in the discussion on 
global governance anymore but is instead addressed in a more nuanced 
way.  What characterizes global administrative law is that policy choices 
result from multiple dialogues among administrative actors in the five 
types of global administration in response to social needs.73  On the one 
hand, a transparent and participatory global administrative process is 
regarded as an effective check on arbitrariness and caprice by exposing 
possible irrational policy choices to public scrutiny. Aided by the 
substantive principle of proportionality, the regulatory decisions of 
global governance will come close to reason and rationality.  In contrast 
to traditional types of dialogue, these dialogues are conducted among 
various special knowledge groups, constituting separate “epistemic 
communities,” so to speak.  Given the prominence of reason and rationality 
in the making of “sound polic[ies]” in transnational regulation,74 the 
entire network can be seen as consisting of “epistemic communities,” 
including officials and civilians with “rival expertise.”75 
 
 71. See Peter L. Lindseth, ‘Weak’ Constitutionalism? Reflections on Comitology 
and Transnational Governance in the European Union, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 145, 
148–51 (2001) (book review) [hereinafter Lindseth, ‘Weak’ Constitutionalism].  See also 
Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 764–65, 778–82. 
 72. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 772–84. 
 73. Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel term this practice “deliberative polyarchy.” 
See id. at 779–84. 
 74. See Lindseth, ‘Weak’ Constitutionalism, supra note 71, at 148 (noting that 
participants in “[t]he process of ‘transnational’ deliberative interaction” concerning the 
making of public policies “must now justify their positions as ‘sound policy’”). 
 75. For the issues concerning the rule by “epistemic communities,” see Martin 
Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8 
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On the other hand, from the perspective of global administrative 
lawyers, enhancing the accountability of global governance makes its 
reasonable and rational regulatory choices more acceptable and thus 
legitimate.  Although policy discourse among experts and professionals 
is more technical and goes beyond the comprehension of nonexperts,76 it 
is argued that expertise-based dialogue within the network is conducted 
in a deliberative, rather than prejudiced, way compared to parliamentary 
debate and street talk.77  On this view, the ideal of deliberative democracy 
seems to find its institutional embodiment in global governance.78  For 
this reason, despite lacking global democracy and deviating from the principal- 
agent model of accountability, an accountable, rational, transparent 
model of global administration is not undemocratic but instead 
legitimate.79 
As described above, global administrative law appears to address both 
the rationality and legitimacy of global governance. It is true that 
democratic legitimacy built on representative democracy is not the only 
working model of legitimacy.  Rather, legitimacy can be a product of 
different mechanisms such as procedural fairness, systematic consistency in 
policy decisions and rational results, to name just three.80  It is also true 
that these multiple models of legitimacy are not mutually exclusive, but 
instead jointly enhance the legitimacy of administration. Multiple models of 
legitimation notwithstanding, it is democratic legitimacy under the 
 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 373–74 (2001) [hereinafter Shapiro, Administrative 
Law Unbounded].  But see Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality, supra 
note 46, at 50–51 (welcoming the increasing institutionalization of “epistemic 
community” through the “comitology” process in the EU.).  For the issue of “rival expertise” 
resulting from the expert-centered model of administration, see Martin Shapiro, 
“Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe 
Echo the E.U.?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 343–49 (2005) [hereinafter Shapiro, 
“Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy]. 
 76. See Shapiro, “Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy, supra note 75, at 
343.  Cf. J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE 
AN EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 349 (1999) (identifying 
“a general sense of political alienation” with the EU comitology). 
 77. See Christian Joerges, “Good Governance” Through Comitology?, in E.U. 
COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS 311, 312–16 (Christian Joerges & 
Ellen Vos eds., 1999). 
 78. See Lindseth, ‘Weak’ Constitutionalism, supra note 71, at 150–51. See also 
Shapiro, “Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy, supra note 75, at 350–51.  Cf. 
Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 779–84 (“deliberative polyarchy”).  For criticism, see 
WEILER, supra note 76, at 283–85. 
 79. See Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 773–84. 
 80. See Esty, supra note 15, at 1518–20, 1521–23. 
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principal-agent paradigm that lies at the center of polemics concerning 
legitimacy.  The other models of legitimacy are designed to address the 
challenges from democratic legitimacy.  As Joshua Cohen and Charles 
Sabel note, even the nascent models of accountability that are considered 
to enhance the legitimacy of global governance still center on the concept of 
democratic accountability based on the principal-agent model.81 
This principal-agent relationship-centered concept of accountability 
and democratic legitimacy is characteristic of traditional domestic 
administrative law.  The United States provides an example of this 
phenomenon.  While the accountability model has long departed from 
the transmission-belt type in the development of American administrative 
law, the Supreme Court has never formally abandoned the nondelegation 
doctrine.82  That it has managed to reinterpret the jurisprudence of 
nondelegation to allow more models of accountability to evolve to 
enhance the legitimacy of administration bears testimony to the grip of 
the principal-agent model in the conception of accountability and 
legitimacy.83  Another example of the centrality of the principal-agent 
model to administrative law is the Chevron doctrine.84  Considered one 
of the most influential decisions in modern American administrative 
law,85 the Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council held 
that the judiciary should defer to administrative agencies in statutory 
interpretation when the statutory provision at issue is unclear.86  While 
this judicial deference is based on the expertise of administrative 
agencies and their accountability to the people by way of the President, 
the Court notes the premise on which administrative agencies play the 
central role in interpreting statutes: “Congress has delegated policymaking 
responsibilities” and agencies exercise interpretive power “within the 
 
 81. See Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 773–79. 
 82. See generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 
(2003); see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV.1669 (1975). 
 83. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 82.  For a theoretical discussion on the 
grip of the principal-agent model on the conception of accountability and legitimacy, see 
Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 774–76. 
 84. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 85. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory 
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 & 824 
(2006) (pointing out that Chevron is “the most cited case in modern public law” and 
“one of the most important rulings in the past quarter century in American public law”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA L. REV. 187, 188 (2000) (noting the 
Chevron decision as a “foundational, even a quasi-constitutional text”). 
 86. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.  It should be noted that even under such 
circumstances, it does not mean that the agency has a carte blanche in interpreting 
statutes.  Instead, agency interpretations must be reasonable. 
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limits of that delegation.”87 Without Congressional delegation or beyond 
the defined limits of delegation by Congress, administrative agencies 
will lose the legitimacy for playing a broad role in statutory interpretation. 
Leaving aside the issue of the principal-agent model of accountability 
and legitimacy, noticeably there is a twofold presumption behind the 
assumption of self-legitimating global governance through policy 
rationality and enhanced accountability.  To take the policy decisions 
resulting from deliberation among epistemic committees involved in 
global administration as “legitimate,” first, a model rational citizenry 
equipped with sufficient scientific knowledge must be presumed.  Such a 
citizenry dissolves the question of transparency to the extent that the 
highly expertise-oriented policy discourse will no longer lie beyond the 
comprehension of the public.  For a multilayered, reason-centered global 
administration to self-legitimate its own decisions, however, requires 
more than accessibility and transparency of its policy deliberations to the 
citizenry. A correspondence between the global administration and 
public concerns is also needed.  A multilayered global regulatory regime 
self-legitimates its decisions only insomuch as the “heavily-committed 
true believers” sitting on the myriad epistemic committees involved in 
global administration can be considered trustees of the general 
citizenry.88  Thus, on this rationalist model of legitimation, as opposed to 
one based on electoral representation, is presumed a general personality 
of the citizenry: citizens assume the common personality of expert, 
albeit with many bodies, which is characterized by a heavily-committed 
true belief in the rational and reasonable solution of public issues 
regardless of who makes the decision.89 
Taken together, global administrative law does not address the rationality 
and legitimacy of global governance as equally as it claims.  As discussed 
 
 87. Id. at 865.  See also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 2001 S. CT. REV. 201 (2002).  For how the Supreme Court subsequently 
reinterpreted Chevron and limited its scope of application by an implicit invocation of 
the nondelegation doctrine, see Sunstein, supra note 85, at 244–47. 
 88. See Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded, supra note 75, at 373–74 
(questioning the model of governance based on “networks consist[ing] of professionals, 
specialists, and heavily-committed true believers”).  According to Cohen and Sabel, a 
trustee-based model of accountability turns out to be no accountability.  See Cohen & 
Sabel, supra note 9, at 776–77. 
 89. See Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State, supra note 31, at 691 
(suggesting scientific rationality); von Bogdandy, supra note 42, at 238 (“practical 
reason”); see also Gráinne de Búrca & Oliver Gerstenberg, The Denationalization of 
Constitutional Law, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 243, 247, 254 (2006) (“reason of the thing”). 
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above, the legitimacy of global administration, which global administrative 
law aims to satisfy by enhancing its accountability, is premised on the 
aforementioned twofold presumption.  However, a conception of legitimacy 
based on presumption comes close to an attempt to “rationalize” the 
status quo of global governance, which is oriented toward rational and 
reasonable policy choices.90  In sum, the incorporation of the values that 
derive from national constitutional experiences and constitute an integral 
part of a global administrative law into a multilevel global constitutional 
order only results in untying the rationalization of global governance 
from the issue of its legitimation. 
B.  Technocratic Constitutionalism without the People 
In traditional legal thinking centering on a domestic legal system, the 
constitution is distinguished from the residual body of ordinary legal 
acts.  Related to this conceptual duality is another evaluative duality: the 
legitimacy of ordinary legal acts is translated into the question of 
constitutionality; the legitimacy of the constitution itself refers to the 
conceptual rubric of the constituent power, despite its multiple formations.91  
That the constitution stands as “the ultimate rule of recognition” for 
domestic and international law rests on its origin in the people’s 
lawgiving, constituent power.92 
In contrast, the constitutionalization of the global legal regime by 
giving normative meanings to the practice of global governance suggests 
a new configuration of the legal order. The binding effect of the 
emerging juridified, transnational, global regime does not rest on state 
 
 90. See Marks, supra note 8, at 997–98; Shapiro, “Deliberative,” “Independent” 
Technocracy, supra note 75, at 346–51; see also B.S. Chimni, Co-Option and 
Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 799 
(2005).  Global administrative law may arguably function as a mechanism of 
contestation rather than cooption, opening a new front for fighting for justice.  See 
Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 52–57; Krisch, supra note 65, at 263–74.  Still, the 
possibility of contesting the result from the expert-minded, rationality-oriented policy-
making mechanism presumes the persona of contestants, who are equally rational and 
acquire rival expertise. 
 91. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 9.  For different interpretations of constituent 
power, see THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007). 
 92. See Ulrich K. Preuss, The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and 
Eastern Europe, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM, supra note 91, at 211.  In traditional international law, state 
consent is the legal basis for the authority of international legal regimes.  National 
constitutions provide the framework within which controversies regarding state consent 
are resolved.  See supra text accompanying notes 53–54.  In this sense, the constitution 
also functions as the ultimate rule of recognition in deciding whether international law is 
binding on particular constitutional systems.  For the meaning of the ultimate rule of 
recognition, see supra note 58. 
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consent.  Rather, its legitimacy arises out of a dynamic process in which 
players in various fields resolve a myriad of issues among themselves in 
response to functional demands and the norm of efficiency.93  These 
commonly accepted solutions can take various forms, including precedents, 
decisions, and standardized regulations.94  What is important is that these 
effective solutions-turned-norms are also “constitutionalized,”95 supplanting 
national constitutions as the “ultimate rule of recognition” in deciding 
what is law and non-law.96  Unlike the relationship between the constitution 
and ordinary legal acts, the process by which global governance is 
juridified is regarded as the origin of global constitutionalization, 
blurring the distinction between constitution-making and ordinary 
lawmaking.97 
 
 93. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 8, 13–15; see also Karl-Heinz Ladeur, 
Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can 
Democracy Survive the End of the Nation State?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 67, at 89, 104 [hereinafter Ladeur, Conversion of 
Democracy to Polycentric Networks]. 
 94. Cf. Fisher-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 35, at 1039–40 (suggesting that 
“default deference” through “mutual observation” among participants in the global 
governing network plays a similar role to “stare decisis”).  For the constitutionalization 
of the private standard-setting process, see Harm Schepel, Constituting Private 
Governance Regimes: Standards Bodies in American Law, in TRANSNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 49, at 161, 164–67; Errol Meidinger, 
Law and Constitutionalism in the Mirror of Non-Governmental Standards: Comments on 
Harm Schepel, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 
49, at 188, 196–97. 
 95. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 8.  See also Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra 
note 35, at 1014–17; Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism, supra note 49, at 7–9.  Cf. 
Ladeur, Post-Modern Constitutional Theory, supra note 45, at 625–26 (suggesting that a 
post-modern constitution be based on the “pre-constituted” condition of today’s 
“experimenting society”).  But cf. Walter, supra note 57, at 191–96 (arguing that 
constitutionalization of international law is limited to the “various sectoral regimes, but 
fails to reach the international community as a whole”). 
 96. See supra note 58. 
 97. At first blush, it does not look very different from the British unwritten 
constitution, which has no clear distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional 
laws.  Two distinctions between global constitutionalism and British constitutionalism 
need to be emphasized, however.  First, only the acts passed by the Parliament rather 
than the practices embedded in an amorphous dynamic process of governance are 
capable of changing the substance of constitutional law.  Relatedly, the second difference 
is in the distinction between institution and conception.  It is one thing to say that due to 
the institutional doctrine of parliamentarian sovereignty in British constitutionalism, 
constitutional acts and nonconstitutional acts, both enacted by the Parliament, are hard to 
tell apart; it is quite another to say that constitutional and nonconstitutional laws in the 
British legal order are conceptually identical.  I thank Mr. David Frank Barnes for 
bringing the example of British common law constitutionalism to my attention.  
Moreover, considering the tradition of “ancient constitution” in British constitutionalism, 
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From this view, global constitutionalism arises from, and is legitimated 
by, the very process through which the various functional systems of 
global governance interactively seek the most efficient solution to the 
problems of globalization.98  The global legal regime’s self-legitimation 
does not take place at the exceptional time of a “constitutional 
moment.”99  Rather, global constitutionalization is embedded in the routine 
operation of the institutions involved in global juridification.100  Thus, 
the regular adjudications by judicial bodies, the specific decisions by 
regulatory agencies, and the routine negotiations among private actors 
all play a role in the constitutionalization of the global legal regime.101  
As a result, autonomous political will, which is traditionally embodied in 
the exercise of constituent power in the making of a constitution, is not 
only reined in by professional and technocratic rationality, but also 
“deformalized” into the pragmatic calculation of concrete solutions to 
particular issues.102 
Global constitutionalism takes multiple forms.  Not all constitutionalists 
pin the prospect of global constitutionalism on the autonomous norm-
making process of administrative law.  Rather, substantive values that 
have been associated with the experiences of constitutional democracies 
are the core of global constitutionalism.103  Even so, to set themselves 
 
“[Britain’s] history [of parliamentary sovereignty] may be understood as a struggle to rid 
the English of the Norman yoke and return to the fair simplicity of the Anglo-Saxon 
constitution” rather than a succession of relaunching the people’s constituent, lawgiving 
power.  See MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 139 & n.67 (2000) (citing J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT 
CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., rev. edn. 1987)). 
 98. See Ladeur, Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks, supra note 93, 
at 92–97; see also Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality, supra note 46, 
at 43–49. 
 99. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) 
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE]; see also Joseph H.H. Weiler, On the Power of 
the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography, in THE EU CONSTITUTION: THE BEST 
WAY FORWARD?, supra note 54, at 3, 13; Dieter Grimm, Integration by Constitution, 3 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 193, 200–01 (2005). 
 100. See also Ming-Sung Kuo, A Farewell to Constitutional Authorship? A Critique 
of the Presentist Turn in the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy (Eur. Univ. Inst. 
Working Paper MWP No. 2008/28), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/ 
1814/9014/1/MWP_2008_28.pdf. 
 101. See Ladeur, Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks, supra note 93, 
at 93–99; see also Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism, supra note 49, at 15–27. 
 102. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 18–19; Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as 
Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and Globalization, 8 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 9, 20–21 (2007).  See also Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism, 
supra note 49, at 24–27.  For the relationship between Schmittean autonomy of the 
political and the concept of constituent power, see generally Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, The Concept of the Political: A Key to Understanding Carl Schmitt’s 
Constitutional Theory, 10 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 5 (1997). 
 103. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, Proportionality Balancing and 
Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNA’L L. 73 (2008). 
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apart from moral cosmopolitans, global constitutionalists make a point 
of the juridification of global governance.  The world not only becomes 
interdependent and globalized but is also effectively ordered in accordance 
with a set of shared norms (i.e., constitutionalized).  In the face of an 
elusive, although not inexistent, global demos, and because of the lack 
of a world constituent assembly, constitutionalists look to other sources 
to make the case that cosmopolitan values are not merely moral 
aspirations but have already exerted an influence on our behavior.104  
Thus, the problem-solving administrative actors, national and transnational, 
public and private, involved in global administration, obviously set the 
best example for how the world order should be constitutionalized.105  
They are the model world citizens who realize how making polices in 
the light of traditional rule-of-law values will contribute to the 
development of global governance. Global constitutionalists are 
enchanted with how administrative actors in particular regulatory fields 
resolve the issues they face effectively and acceptably, while “sectoralism” 
seems to dominate the discourse on the constitutionalization or 
juridification of global governance.106 
 
 104. Even if current international law suggests the possibility of its evolving into a 
“common law of humankind,” it should be noted that “this evolution will occur only if 
most human beings acquire a global perception of themselves as part of a common 
group,” attaining the status of a global demos.  See von Bogdandy, supra note 42, at 233-
37 (citing and discussing Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival 
of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, General Course on Public International Law, 
in 281 RECUEIL DES COURS 10 (1999)).  Yet, as German legal scholar Armin von 
Bogdandy acknowledges, “[t]here are hints that such a shift in self-perception is under 
way, but the new perception has not yet established itself to such an extent that it 
substantially informs many decisions on the international plane.”  See id. at 237.  See 
also Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 796–97. 
 105. Cf. Teubner, Global Private Regimes, supra note 68, at 72–75 (arguing that the 
growing private regulation, agreements, and dispute resolution mechanisms focused on 
“security of expectation and solution of conflicts” as “sources of law without the state”). 
 106. Compare Harold J. Berman, The Western Legal Tradition in a Millennial 
Perspective: Past and Future, 60 LA. L. REV. 739, 763 (2000) (indicating that in order to 
form “world legal tradition,” legal cultures and traditions will need to commit to 
integration and to examine their belief systems in order for the “forces of world 
integration [] to overcome the forces of disintegration”), with JOHN P. MCCORMICK, 
WEBER, HABERMAS, AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL, 
SOCIAL AND SUPRANATIONAL DEMOCRACY 231–86 (2007) (theorizing how the new 
constitutional democratic model of Europe that goes beyond the nation-state tradition 
can build up in distinct social and functional “sectors”). See also Cassese, Administrative 
Law Without the State, supra note 31, at 679–80; Teubner, Global Private Regimes, 
supra note 68. 
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While the values cherished in global administrative law are widely 
accepted, how they are implemented and translated into diverse 
administrative fields is not beyond contestation. “Who governs and 
how,” the central issue concerning the legitimacy and organization of 
power, not only looms in the creation of values but also in their 
articulation and implementation.107  In traditional constitutionalism, this 
issue lies in the hands of “We the People,” whether in the form of a 
constituent assembly, a referendum, or the procedural mechanisms 
centering on electoral representation.108  In contrast, global constitutionalists 
turn to the routine operation of functional systems and the everyday 
adoption of traditional rule-of-law values by players in the process of 
global governance without reference to another external source of 
ultimate authority such as the people. While a process of everyday 
constitutionalization appears, to global constitutionalists, to be heralding 
a new era for legal thinking by conflating the constituent-constituted 
distinction,109 on close inspection the attempt to derive constitutionalism 
from governance and administrative law on the global scale looks 
technocratic in the absence of the people from the scene of global 
constitutionalization. 
 
 
 107. Compare Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State, supra note 31, at 692 
(speaking of the potential jurisdictional conflicts with the increase of “global 
administrative courts (panels)” but leaving this issue unaddressed and emphatically 
taking this increase of global administrative courts as an indicator of “the high degree of 
institutionalization . . . of the global administrative system), with Shapiro, 
Administrative Law Unbounded, supra note 75, at 377 (noting that “who governs and 
how remains the central and pressing questions  . . . in the [global] age of governance 
and emphasizing that “[t]he answers . . . are likely to be more complex”).  See also 
Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 18, at 10; Krisch, supra note 65, at 274–77. 
 108. See generally ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTION, AND 
LEGITIMACY (2000).  To the extent that judicial landmark decisions stand as the lode star 
for government agencies and individuals to refer to in making decisions, the judiciary 
may be seen as another embodiment of “We the People.”  See, e.g., MIGUEL POIARES 
MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998).  Still, a distinction needs to be drawn, at least in 
theory: a judicial interpretation to substantiate the general clause of the constitution and 
one that substitutes for a statutory or even constitutional provision.  See Zenon 
Bankowski et al., Rationales for Precedent, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 481 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).  See 
also ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 99, at 86–94 (arguing for a 
“preservationist” judiciary in constitutional democracy). 
 109. Cf. Neil Walker, Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the 
European Union, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM, supra note 91, at 247 (proposing a “post-constituent 
constitutionalism,” which would assume “a classificatory division between ‘constitutive 
references’ and ‘constituted references,’” as an alternative to current constitutional 
discourses on the development of transnational constitutionalism in Europe). 
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C.  From Fragmentation to Duality? Making Global Administrative Law 
with Global Constitutionalism as the Constitutive Other 
Considered overall, the seeming unity of global public law identified 
in Part II consists of dual reflexivity, as suggested in the preceding two 
sections. In addition to the reflexive relationship between global 
governance and global administrative law,110 reflexivity exists between 
global constitutionalism and global administrative law.  On the one 
hand, in attempting to go beyond organizational aspects to the normative 
issues of global governance, global administrative law incorporates 
values that are derived from national constitutional experiences, constituting 
an integral part of a multilevel global constitutional order.111  On the 
other hand, global constitutionalism refers to the development of global 
administrative law as the evidence for the emerging constitutionalization 
of global governance.112  In sum, the unity of global public law is 
embedded in the dual reflexivity between global administrative and 
constitutional law. 
However, behind the guise of identitarian unity built on this dual 
reflexivity lies the fragmentation, or rather separation, between global 
administrative and constitutional law.  At the heart of the reflexivity 
between global administrative law and global constitutionalism is the 
bracketing of the values and practices that emerge from the other branch 
of global public law.  The problems haunting the other branch are 
filtered out in the reception of values and practices.  As a result, global 
administrative law and global constitutionalism are fragmented or 
separated because they refer to, without critically reflecting on, each 
other.113 
Nevertheless, from its own perspective, global administrative law does 
not lose sight of global constitutional law, despite bracketing the 
problems that accompany the values it adopts from the constitutional 
 
 110. See supra text accompanying 62–64. 
 111. See Frank Schorkopf & Christian Walter, Elements of Constitutionalization: 
Multilevel Structures of Human Rights Protection in General International and WTO-
Law, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1359 (2003), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/ 
Vol04No12/PDF_Vol_04_No_12_1359-1374_European_Schorkopf_Walter.pdf. 
 112. See Cassese, Administrative Law without the State, supra note 31, at 687–89.  
See also Cassese, Globalization of Law, supra note 12, at 985–86. 
 113. Cf. Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 
64, at 1, 10–11 (noting that constitutional framework has paid little attention to the “new 
governance” model of transnational administrative regulation in the EU context). 
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field.  Global administrative law is constructed in consciousness of the 
issues of a legitimacy deficit and democratic legitimacy, which are 
embedded in the projection of traditional administrative law tools and 
values onto the global administrative space.114  Yet, to get global 
administrative law going and to address the day-to-day business of 
global governance pragmatically without being dragged down into 
complicated theoretical debates, the fundamental issues concerning 
legitimacy and democracy are left undecided, or “outsourced” to 
constitutional territory.115  In this view, global constitutionalism as a 
province distinct from global administrative law in the territory of global 
public law does not disappear from the perspective of those devoted to 
the making of global administrative law.116  Still, what differentiates 
global public law from domestic public law is that the legitimacy of the 
latter is presumed to be or to have been resolved in the constitutional 
sphere.  In contrast, the legitimacy of global public law is contested 
either in the province of administrative law or in the space of global 
constitutionalism.117  Taken as a whole, global constitutionalism stands 
in the background as the constitutive other to the construction of the 
identity of global administrative law, pointing to the relationship of 
duality between constitutional law and administrative law that we find 
embedded in the traditional thinking of public law.118 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The global rule of law is an enterprise worth fighting for, not only for 
practitioners but also for scholars.  There are a variety of ways in which 
scholars can contribute to its coming and consolidation.  Both providing 
advice to practitioners and setting out a modality of new discourse by 
way of which the world can be seen and re-imagined in a positive light 
are equally important attempts in this joint enterprise.  My contribution 
to this enterprise is to critically examine the status of global administrative 
law in the construction of global constitutionalism. 
My investigation of the relationship between global administrative law 
and global constitutional law suggests the unity of global legality, 
whether it be called administrative law or constitutionalism.  I argue that 
 
 114. See Esty, supra note 15, at 1502–11; see also ALFRED C. AMAN JR., THE 
DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004). 
 115. See Krisch, supra note 65, at 267–68, 276–78. 
 116. See id. at 248. 
 117. Compare Esty, supra note 15, at 1509–11 (discussing the legitimacy of 
supranational governance through the lens of administrative procedure), with von 
Bogdandy, supra note 42, at 233–37 (exploring the legitimacy of international order in 
light of the constitutionalization of world federalism). 
 118. See Harlow, supra note 3, at 208. 
KUO 7/22/2009  4:32:58 PM 
[VOL. 10:  439, 2009]  Between Fragmentation and Unity 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 467 
this identitarian unity between administrative law and constitutional law 
in the global context consists of dual reflexivity, while on close inspection 
underneath this reflexive unity is the fragmentation or separation 
between global administrative law and global constitutionalism, posing 
challenges to the ideal of the global rule of law.  On the one hand, global 
administrative lawyers focus on the global coordination or rationalization of 
administrative policies without paying sufficient attention to its impacts 
on the development of global constitutionalism.  On the other hand, by 
premising global constitutionalization on the practices of global regulation, 
global constitutionalists overlook the problems inherent in global 
administrative law itself.  As a result, the status quo of global 
administrative law can hold up only by “outsourcing” the fundamental 
challenges to global constitutionalism.  In sum, global legality is saved 
from fragmentation not by a unitary global public law but instead by 
assuming the “legal duality” we have been accustomed to in traditional 
legal thinking. 
Returning to the enterprise of the global rule of law, the discovery of a 
presumed legal duality implicit in the construction of global administrative 
law does not devalue the contribution of global administrative law to the 
rationalization and legitimation of global governance because this 
discovery is evocative of traditional legal thinking rather than being a 
new beginning for jurisprudence.  However, the danger lies in the fact 
that this duality shelters the fundamental issues from being critically 
reflected upon.  In terms of global administrative law, they are relegated 
to the field of global constitutionalism as a perceived “other,” which is 
necessary for the construction of global administrative law.  The strategy 
of making global administrative law by postulating a constitutive other 
makes the legalization of global governance possible, but also provisional, 
with difficult, fundamental issues undecided.119  If my observation is 
correct, it may be the case that normative issues concerning global 
governance cannot be fully addressed until the relationship between 
global administrative law and global constitutional law is brought to the 
fore in the discussion of the global rule of law. 
 
 
 119. Based on the EU experience, Nico Krisch considers this an asset in the 
development of the transnational rule of law.  See Krisch, supra note 65, at 274–77.  But 
see Ulrich Haltern, A Comment on Von Bogdandy, in DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 45, 52–53 (Beate Kohler-Koch & Berthold 
Rittberger eds., 2007) (questioning the fragility of contested political meaning in the 
EU.). 
